The International and Local Momentum to Stop the War in Sudan: Opportunities and Challenges

Dr. Abdul Rahman Al-Ghali

Translated by: Ramadan Ahmed

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Introduction:

There are certain facts that are self-evident, but it’s essential to remind ourselves of them so that our discourse remains meaningful and doesn’t deviate towards diversionary issues. These facts include the following: Politics in general, and international politics in particular, are based on interests. It’s undeniable that every state, organisation, or group has specific interests it seeks to achieve or ensure, whether they are material or moral interests (such as influence, ideology, etc.). Consequently, mediations, positions, and various pressures aim to achieve these interests for different parties, and the ultimate result is the outcome of the struggle of interests and visions for all international, regional, and national parties. Our country has regional and global ambitions, both implicit and explicit, which parties seek through political or even direct military means, as we see in our current war. However, we must benefit from any activity in the interest of our country while being aware of the agendas of those involved and opposing it when it contradicts our national interests and even resisting it. The vision I believe in is that a peaceful political solution is the best option whenever it achieves national goals and avoids crossing red lines or national imperatives. There will be no sustainable political solution unless it includes all Sudanese components. This is the lesson from all recent wars.

In light of this introduction, I present my view on the recent political and civil forces meetings in Paris, Montreux, and Helsinki.

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Paris – Montreux – Helsinki Meetings:

On 15 April 2024, the Sudanese Civil Dialogue Seminar was held in Paris, organised by the European Union and the French and German governments on the sidelines of the International Humanitarian Conference. From 17 to 21 April 2024, a consultative meeting of Sudanese civil and political forces was held in Montreux, Switzerland, at the invitation of the Swiss Foreign Ministry and the ProMediation organisation. From 25 to 26 April 2024, another meeting was held in Helsinki, organised by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) for civil and political forces to attend a meeting of the Expanded African Mechanism on Sudan. The participants were invited in their personal capacities (meaning they did not represent their organisations but were chosen because of their significant positions in their organisations). Another aspect is that these activities are conducted based on the “Chatham House Rule,” the guiding spirit of these rules is summarised by the saying: “Share the information you receive, but do not disclose the identity of the speaker.” Therefore, many discussions could be obtained from the personal pages of the participants and invitees on social media, as well as from mainstream media or testimonies recorded by activists among the participants.

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Firstly: Sudanese Civil Dialogue Seminar in Paris, 15 April 2024:

One of the most significant achievements of this meeting was bringing together various parties. It gathered members from different factions, including the “Taqadum” bloc and its key representatives: Dr Abdullah Hamdouk, the bloc’s leader; Dr. Altajani Al-Sissi, the head of the National Movement forces; Mr Jaafar Al-Sadiq Al-Mirghani, the leader of the Democratic Bloc; Ms Salwa Adam Baniya, the humanitarian aid commissioner in the Sudanese government from the People’s Movement-North faction of Malik Agar; Dr. Yasser Fathi Kadouda from the National Accord Alliance led by Mubarak Al-Fadil; as well as individuals affiliated with Islamists, in addition to tribal figures like Sultan Saad Bahreldin and figures from civil society, distant from progressivism. The meeting discussed a purely political agenda aimed at understanding the opinions and trends of various groups regarding how to stop the war, the necessary transition elements, and the requirements for reconstruction, as mentioned by one of the participants on his page. This aligns with the details provided by Dr Mohammed Naji Al-Asam in his apology for not participating, where he stated that the agenda includes “a significant political agenda, such as: what are the principles that should be present in a ceasefire agreement, what is the form of the new transition, and how can Sudan be governed constitutionally after the war?” Of course, the meeting did not conclude with the agreed-upon results, which is expected in the first meeting. However, it is good that people are moving forward step by step after breaking the psychological barrier of meeting with various parties to expand the scope to include what we see as suitable and necessary for a comprehensive and sustainable political solution, which is the Sudanese inclusive dialogue that excludes no one and is not dominated by anyone.

Critiques of the Meeting:

Dr Mohammed Naji Al-Asam mentioned what he saw as inhibiting factors preventing his attendance at the meeting (we agree with some of them and not with all):

• The participants had limited time to prepare their views on major political issues since the invitation and agenda were disclosed very late, and the seminar’s time for discussing these issues was short (only one day).

• The Sudanese themselves should have set the agenda, or at least they must have been consulted.

• Reservations about the method of involving individuals associated with the former regime and others who contributed to and supported the October 2021 coup.

He believed that democratic forces were faced with a fait accompli. If the democratic forces wanted dialogue with those groups, the decision should have been made autonomously and after discussing and clarifying the justifications to the public.

Dr. Mohammed believed that this method weakens the cohesion of democratic civil forces.

These are the justifications for the boycott, and I agree with the procedural errors intended to place participants in front of a fait accompli. I also agree with the necessity for Sudanese ownership of the political process and setting its agenda. However, I believe these issues could have been raised within the meeting itself, as attendees are not obligated to adhere to its outcomes, and attendees only represent themselves. The meeting itself is a preliminary process, not the anticipated national dialogue conference, which should be Sudanese-owned.

I’m afraid I have to disagree with the refusal to sit with individuals associated with the former regime and supporters of the 25 October coup for several reasons. Firstly, the war and humanitarian catastrophe have created a new situation where ending the war is a priority. Secondly, these forces have been divided between the two camps and have entered into the same civil democratic organisations, such as the inclusion of Al-Hajj’s group, Kamal Omar’s group, Suleiman Sandal’s group, Taher Hajer’s group, Hadi Idris’s group, and Mohammed Hassan Al-Mirghani’s group.

In conclusion, given our knowledge of the motivations and objectives of international and regional actors, the meeting represents a useful step in breaking the psychological barrier hindering inclusive Sudanese dialogue. This barrier is harmful regardless of its motivations, whether genuine or fabricated, and its monopolisation of the right and, therefore, the civil voice and people’s representation. The Sudanese issue is the concern of all Sudanese people, and it is remarkable how political forces, which fundamentally rely on and operate within mass politics, overlook this reality.

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Secondly: Montreux, Switzerland: Unofficial Consultations to Support the Sudanese Political Process, 17-20 April 2024

These consultations were organised by the Swiss Foreign Ministry in collaboration with the ProMediation organisation. They are an extension of a dialogue session held in July 2023. The invitation included 20 individuals and representatives from the African Union. One participant from eastern Sudan indicated that the invitees were different from those in the Paris conference list.

Like the Paris conference, the purpose of this meeting was to create a common ground and bridge the gap between Sudanese parties, leading to a vision for a comprehensive political process and an end to the war. Switzerland also seeks to be a party to benign efforts or mediation in the Sudanese issue through this effort. The meeting also commits to secrecy and not sharing its deliberations with the media.

As for the ProMediation organisation, we have previously discussed it in articles about its workshops on Sudan in Cairo, Niger, and Ethiopia. The organisation also describes itself as interested in the Darfur region and eastern Sudan.

Based on the information provided about the meeting, there were also positive points, such as bringing together divergent Sudanese parties (although the meeting was not comprehensive) and Sudanese consensus on the necessity of ending the war, Sudanese unity, the necessity of a national Sudanese dialogue, and civil governance for a unified Sudan that respects diversity, even if they disagreed on the rest of the details and the interpretation of the comprehensive Sudanese dialogue and other issues.

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The Helsinki Meeting (Finland) on 25-26 April 2024

This meeting was organised by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) to convene the Expanded African Mechanism regarding Sudan, presenting its ongoing initiatives to the participants and reviewing political and humanitarian initiatives in Paris, Jeddah, and elsewhere.

The CMI is a Finnish peace organisation working in conflict prevention and resolution. According to its official website, the organisation had gathered a group of Sudanese civilians and influential national figures in Nairobi on September 5-6, 2023, to identify mechanisms for unifying civil forces to stop the war. Those interested in accessing information about that workshop and the participating groups can refer to Finland’s official website of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI).

Similar to previous meetings, the attendees in Helsinki agreed on positive generalities, such as the necessity to stop the war, address the humanitarian situation, pursue a comprehensive political process, unify initiatives, engage civilians, and monitor the ceasefire once reached.

The good news here is that there is a trend towards Sudanese acceptance of sitting with each other, and we hope it expands to include everyone to solve the problem. The bad news is that if Sudanese receive such invitations from foreigners, they accept them naively. Still, if they come from nationalists, they turn them down, which is the height of susceptibility to colonisation. However, late acceptance is better than no acceptance at all.

In the next meeting, God willing, we will continue the old discussion about the nature and description of this war, which was interrupted due to the inappropriateness of discussing it at that time for the public interest. Now that events have unfolded and become clear to everyone, it is necessary to discuss them so that each person can take responsibility for their position.